Like many who looked to the institutional level to theorize above the level of individuals, organizations and groups, but below the totalities of structuralist Marxism and neo-functionalism, I was drawn to and drew from the practice theory of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu built a theoretical apparatus conjoining structure and individual, yet refused the rational, sovereign subject as a starting point, rather positing the body as a social operator, putting embodied practices at the centre of his theory. Working at supra-organizational levels, he made power interior to culture. I was dazzled, and yet dissatisfi ed, a dissatisfaction that I now better understand and would like to try to articulate, for I think a serious consideration of this great thinker clarifi es how daunting the task of developing an adequate institutional theory is going to be.
Organization 16(6) Articles be possible to develop a new intellectual space between rational subjects on the one hand, and objective and lawful social structures on the other. 1 This essay will fi rst lay out the logic of Bourdieu's approach to habitus and fi eld, habitus as the transformation of position into individual disposition, and fi eld as the objective structuring of those positions which command different amounts of the capital dominant in the fi eld. Scholars have criticized Bourdieu's practice theory for what they see as his economic reduction, pointing to the import of autonomous moral and political dimensions (Alexander, 1995; Lamont, 1992) . The problem, I will argue, is not cultural autonomy or economic reduction, as much as it is the theorization of the logic of practice as a generic contest for domination in a plurality of homologously organized fi elds.
I will argue that power is both the primary interest of practice and motor of fi eld dynamics in Bourdieu's theory. Bourdieu aligns all practices through the logic of domination, which allows him to homologize group relations in every fi eld. This homologization depends on a homogenization of fi elds, the sociological effacement of their cultural specifi city. I illustrate that effacement by examining fi rst his treatment of culture, which he understands as a primary medium for social reproduction of dominant groups, and next his treatment of the sexual division of labour, which he understands as the originary model for the organization of social domination. In both I seek to show how Bourdieu politicizes culture as opposed to culturalizing power, thereby homogenizing the logic of practice across institutional fi elds.
In the remainder of the essay I compare Bourdieu's model of the practical logic of fi elds to my own understanding of the institutional logic of practice (Friedland, 2002 (Friedland, , 2009 Friedland and Alford, 1991) . Whereas Bourdieu uses a commensurable logic of practice to differentiate agonistic groups seeking power; I parse practices into incommensurable institutional logics. Within the framework of institutional logics, power is a medium whereas in Bourdieu's fi elds, it has primacy both as an end and as a determinant of practice. In keeping with Aristotle's notion of praxis, institutional logics join subjects, practices and objects into bundled sets which have an inner referentiality, a performative order, in which an unobservable substance is enacted in practice. This understanding of institutional logic suggests that love, too, may offer a useful template with which to think the social.
Habitus, Capital and Practice
Bourdieu developed his theory of practice through his early ethnographic studies of the Kabyle Berbers in the highlands of Algeria. For Bourdieu practice is habitual, primarily non-discursive and un-refl exive, routinized behaviours, scripts not scripted, regular but not rule-bound. Bourdieu's is not a sociology of action, centred on rational or meaningful behaviour of a knowing subject, nor a behavioural sociology centred on determined repertoires that can be described independently of their meaning for those 4 Organization 16(6) Articles afford both a generality and a polysemous quality which enable a given act, object, location or time to be looked at from multiple points of view, using a host of loosely interchangeable, parallel, weakly analogical oppositions (Bourdieu, 1977: 117-119, 124-130) . On the one hand, this is functional for a culturally effi cient integration of the social order in which endless variations on a 'few generative principles' structure all practices across all fi elds (Bourdieu, 1977: 110-112, 141-142) . On the other hand, there is always room for maneuver, for manipulation of meanings.
Bourdieu's society operates through socialization with cunning. It is the gap between habitus and institutional structure-whether due to the conditions of formation of a habitus being misaligned with the conditions in which the agent operates or due to the very economical quality of its operations that depends on a 'fuzzy logic'-that makes both creative agency and critical social movement possible. It is a theory of path dependency, of social inertia, where both distinctive personal and collective new histories are made out of disjuncture between embodied pasts and institutional presents (Bourdieu 1990b: 62-63) .
The Class of Culture
Habitus, as disposition, is the embodiment of 'conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence', its foundational layers having been set down in response to the material necessities of one's youth (Bourdieu, 1990b: 53-54) . Class condition permeates all others, making habitus into a class unconscious, a corporeal, cultural mode of being manifest in language, thought, taste, understandings, a socially stratifi ed common sense and a powerful mechanism of social reproduction.
Taste, manifest in cultural capital, is politically powerful, because, as we shall see, power is the sociological content of culture. We, too, have become Kabyle, status honour, the collective recognition of certain behaviours as honourable, the form in which we misrecognize class. Class is transmuted in misrecognized, and therefore legitimating, form as taste through primary socialization in the family and cultivation and consecration through the school (Bourdieu, 1984: 85, 250) . Taste is naturalized social position, the 'sense of the social structure' (Bourdieu, 1984: 474) . Cultural capacities, an inherited ability to appreciate and categorize, and hence to consume, particular kinds of distinguished, and hence distinguishing, cultural objects becomes a marker of one's superior essence, an unacknowledged criterion for recruitment to and performance within elite schools, which then consecrate that distinction through a title-degree or certifi cate-which becomes the basis of recruitment to elite positions in the state and corporate world (Bourdieu, 1996) . The granting of diplomas, an objectifi cation of symbolic capital, Bourdieu argues, beyond certifying a technical competence, as a result of 'the hidden linkage between scholastic aptitude and cultural heritage', creates a 'veritable state nobility, whose authority and legitimacy are guaranteed by the academic title' (Bourdieu, 1998: 22) . Dominant groups
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reproduce themselves through the distinctiveness of their culture and their superior access to scholastic titles, which, like 'the dubbing of a knight', makes them 'licensed to dominate' (Bourdieu, 1998: 21-22) .
In Distinction, his cartography of French consumption patterns, Bourdieu argues that the distinction, or status, which accrues to life style, is the form in which a class essentializes its right to privilege, grounding it in its members' apparent being, rather than in their historically arbitrary becoming. Capitalist production is legitimated in consumption. Bourdieu's thesis is that class is both manifested and legitimated in the ways in which class members classify. Class, he writes, is a 'universal principle of explanation and classifi cation, defi ning the rank occupied in all possible fi elds' (Bourdieu, 1984: 114) . Behind the welter of cultural practices arrayed there Bourdieu discerns a unitary, generative principle: 'class habitus, the internalized form of class condition and of the conditionings it entails' (Bourdieu, 1984:101) . Specifi cally he argues that the aesthetic disposition, manifested in the ability to autonomize form from content, to neutralize function, distinguishes the dominant class. Grounded in disinterest, from either pleasure or the good, the Kantian aesthetic is a bourgeois form.
The working class, whose practices all bespeak the coercive force of necessity in their existence, is the zero point against which each class seeks to distinguish itself. The working class embodies pure materiality and function, the vulgar aesthetic par excellence. Distinction is defi ned negatively, as difference, ['the gaps which are the essence of the race' (Bourdieu, 1984: 251) ], against those poorer in economic and cultural capital. 'The dominated classes', he writes, 'intervene in the symbolic struggles to appropriate the distinctive properties … and … to defi ne the legitimate properties and the legitimate mode of appropriation, as a passive reference point, a foil'. In consequence they experience themselves as culturally unworthy, as a nature vis-a-vis the dominant's culture (Bourdieu, 1984: 251) .
The stake of stakes in the class struggle is the 'legitimate principle of domination' (Bourdieu, 1984: 254) . If the theory has a Marxist motor; it is a Nietzschean frame. It was Nietzsche who declared that in place of 'sociology', a 'theory of forms of domination. In place of "society", the culture complex, as my chief interest (as a whole or in its parts)' (Nietzsche, 1967: 255) . And like Nietzsche the locus of this most socially productive struggle is not between the dominant class and the dominated class. Nietzsche's understood value creation as a clash between rival wills to power between the dominants, not between them and 'the herd'. Likewise for Bourdieu the differences that make a difference are within the dominant class, over the relative effi cacy of economic, educational, cultural and social capitals. 'Social identity', Bourdieu writes, 'lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat' (Bourdieu, 1984: 479) . Indeed the dominated do not exist as a class, but as a '"mass" of … contingent, disorganized multiplicity,
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Organization 16(6) Articles interchangeable and innumerable, existing only statistically' (Bourdieu, 1984: 468) . Bourdieu here culturally transmutes class struggle into a clash of differential disinterests, ascetic intellectuals without money versus the mindlessly and luxuriant monied, both of whom distinguish themselves against the popular, base working class weighted down by necessity, propelled by impulse, those who would have registered in Nietzsche's nostrils (Bourdieu, 1984: 255) .
Bourdieu derives the content of dominant cultural forms from their difference, not from anything immanent within them. Aesthetic distinction is organized by its distance from necessity, from bodily hungers, and, just like science, according to internal structures of difference, 'obligatory pairs of opposites'-whether aesthetic or epistemological schools-which typically have 'no content' other than the opposition between the posi-tions in the institutional fi eld with which they are associated (Bourdieu, 2000: 101) . Both in his studies of cultural consumption and production, Bourdieu makes the politics of culture into a struggle for an empty cell: the transhistorical space of domination. This allows him to sociologize the logic of structuralist linguistics, where meanings are founded on hierarchical differences between signs and the distribution of capitals with which they are associated. In the domain of cultural consumption the signs by which a group knows itself do not signify by their relation to referents, but by their distance from necessity, from the absence of referents, from poverty with regard to the world of objects. This distance is marked by abstraction, the mastery of codes, refi nement, intellection, non-representation, an aesthetic indifference to the sensuous tasks of survival.
The theory is breath-taking; it is also empirically problematic. I am not talking about the research showing that while cultural capital does shape academic success (DiMaggio, 1982) , it has not prevented a massive accession of those born to neither cultural or economic capital to higher degrees and powerful positions (DiMaggio, 2007; Goldthorpe, 2007) . I am referring to the data that Bourdieu himself provides. Distinction consists primarily of a series of tabular and correspondence analyses of stated preferences or reports about behavior of a random sample of French people organized according to occupational categories. These tables do not demonstrate the relative effects of different forms of capital on these preferences. Although he ranks cultural practices by their degree of legitimacy, he provides no evidence that they indeed legitimate. Bourdieu simply maps cultural differences on to a set of occupational differences.
The problem is that many, if not most, of the differences do not differentiate the class hierarchy. Bourdieu, for example, asked respondents to judge whether a photographer could make a beautiful, interesting, meaningless or ugly photo of a fi rst communion, a folk dance, a pregnant woman, cabbages, the bark of a tree, a snake or a sunset over the sea (Bourdieu, 1984: 35-38) . Take the cabbage. To imagine it beautiful, you've got to hold cole slaw, the low price of cabbage, and fl atulence at bay. But in the case of cabbage, only 7% of the working class, 11% of the middle class and 18% of the upper
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The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu Roger Friedland classes think it would make a beautiful photograph (Bourdieu, 1984: 37, 526-527) . Most French people don't think it can be pretty. Recall that the dominated classes are hypothesized to refuse meaningless images, to reject treating them as 'an image signifying itself, and therefore having no other referent than itself' (Bourdieu, 1984: 42) But the table shows that about half of each of the three classes-working, middle, upper-think it would make a meaningless photo. As for most other cultural practices French social classes are not culturally distinct.
For a practice to legitimate a class, for it to be misrecognized as a sign of its essential nature, it must signify of and for its practitioners. Particularly if the class is not culturally distinct, the cultural practice must be class distinct.
2 In most cases, this does not hold. While there are often class differentials across practices, the larger numbers in the lesser classes tend to wash out the differentials between classes. Enter the cabbage: if you found somebody able to aestheticize its foliated form, it is only even money that they would be from the better classes. It's diffi cult to imagine how this aesthetic disposition would legitimate the dominant class if the overwhelming majority of the dominant class doesn't think it aesthetic and those who do think it beautiful are not overwhelming from the dominant class. 3 Bourdieu has not erased popular culture, as is sometimes alleged. He has neutered it. Approvingly citing Bakhtin's analysis of the hierarchical inversions of the carnivalesque in Rabelais, Bourdieu emphasizes the impotence of transgression (Bourdieu, 1984: 491) . The dominated can oppose the dominant, but in his schema they can only engage in strategies of inversion, valorizing what is devalued, thereby excluding themselves from the social power to evaluate (Bourdieu, 1984: 477-478, 559) . Indeed contests by the dominated within any institutional fi eld tend to reproduce it. In the domain of law, for instance, considering the role of complainants and defendants, Bourdieu generalizes the juridicalization of confl ict as an instance of 'negative functionalism'. 'These processes', he writes, 'urge us to think that any form of opposition to dominant interests fulfi ll a useful function for the perpetuation of the fundamental order of the social fi eld: that heresy tends to reinforce the very order which, while it combats it simultaneously welcomes and absorbs it and emerges even stronger from the confrontation' (Bourdieu, 1987: 837) .
As a series of class-based homologues, Bourdieu's theory undercuts the transformative possibilities of any classifi catory system. Part of the problem is that he defi nes the dominant cultural forms not by their content, but by their difference. The politics of cultural contest is a struggle for the space of domination, and only secondarily the logic of domination. This is true not only in consumption of culture, but in its production. Bourdieu speaks about the production of ideas and art as governed by a 'cultural fi eld', which defi nes itself in opposition to other fi elds, a fi eld dominated by an internal cultural legitimacy as opposed to legitimacy which derives from these other fi elds (economic, political and religious) (Bourdieu, 1969) . Agents are 8 Organization 16(6) Articles driven by the fi eld to compete for 'cultural legitimacy'. Indeed, the logic of the fi eld is equivalent to this competition. Specifi cally, the artists, writers, critics and reviewers, galleries and publishing houses, academies and universities which constitute the cultural fi eld are driven by competition for consecration by those recognized as authorities (Bourdieu, 1969) . Different kinds of cultural products have different degrees of legitimacy, marked by the parallel legitimacy of the institutions which provide legitimation. Legitimacy is marked by successful claims to universality (Bourdieu, 1998: 142) . It is the struggle for legitimacy, for consecration, and to legitimate the legitimating authorities that makes one's products legitimate, that animates the history of the cultural world.
Agents who engage in different practices do struggle for legitimacy, for authority, for recognition whether by publishing houses, universities or the state. However, when Bourdieu reduces the logic of the cultural fi eld to the struggle for cultural legitimacy, he replicates the moves of those American institutionalists who emphasize the process by which new forms are made real, legitimate, accountable and general. The meaning of the cultural production, its hermeneutic content, slips from view, in much the same way that production studies in culture tend to make the meanings of what is produced incidental to the analysis. The specifi c properties of the production and the product are sociologically inert. The logic of an institutional fi eld is given by struggles for trans-institutional operators: domination, legitimacy, universality. Culture has a political content; power lacks a cultural content. Habitus is a here an embodied relation to means, class a crass struggle for distinction.
The Power of Sex
That for Bourdieu the logic of practice is overwhelmingly the pursuit, performance, and reproduction of power is very clear in Masculine Domination, a volume in which he returned to the sexual principles undergirding his early studies of the Kabyle. The sexed domestic space is, for Bourdieu, both the ur form and site of the 'original illusio', and the medium for the formation of a habitus that allows us to function in all fi elds. 'The initial form of illusio', he writes, 'is investment in the domestic space, the site of a complex process of the socialization of the sexual and the sexualization of the social' (Bourdieu, 2000: 166) . It is here that our desire to be recognized, esteemed, indeed loved by others is transmuted into a social world by our becoming objects for the valuations of powerful subjects, where we fi rst learn to play a game whose mechanism and object-particularly for men-is domination.
That originary site is organized through a sexualized power structure. 'The social order', he writes, 'functions as an immense symbolic machine tending to ratify the masculine domination on which it is founded' (Bourdieu, 2001: 9) . Bourdieu delineates a trans-historical, androcentric order which imprints, or 'somatizes', power relations between men and
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The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu Roger Friedland women into their very bodies, their bodily hexis as posture, carriage and feeling, their differentiated locations in physical and social space, in a skein of homologous metaphorical oppositions (hard/soft, out/in) which not only convert power into bodily nature, but then grounds those power relations in that 'naturalized social construction', thereby grounding domination in the senses (Bourdieu, 2001: 23) . These metaphorical orders, this system of classifi cation, is not only applied to sexually marked bodies, but incorporated in their very comportment. It also organizes the social and institutional positions which are sexed by their differential recruitment of men and women, differentials justifi ed by those very bodily differences.
The social world constructs the body as a sexually defi ned reality and as the depository of sexually defi ning principles of vision and division. This embodied social programme of perception is applied to all the things of the world and fi rstly to the body itself, in its biological reality. It is this programme which constructs the difference between the biological sexes in conformity with the principles of a mythic vision of the world rooted in the arbitrary relationship of domination of men over women, itself inscribed, with the division of labour, in the reality of the social order (Bourdieu, 2001: 11) .
Sexed cognition becomes an act of submission to sexual domination, its ultimate source. This sexed doxa derives from the homological alignment of embodiment, classifi cation and social division.
Bourdieu not only makes power into the constituting principle of sexual division, he makes that power-laden sexual division the machine language of all forms of domination. State authority, founded arbitrarily and with violence, itself depends on this primary incorporation of the family structure of domination as habitus, 'inscription of a relation of domination in the body' (Bourdieu, 2000: 168) . The meaning of sexual difference is the power that constitutes it. Indeed for Bourdieu the family is not only a legitimate structure of domination, a compact between men and women held together by the symbolic violence to which women submit, but between fathers and children by the children's hateful submission to their father's mediation of the social 'reality' principle. In traditional society family cohesion, Bourdieu argues, 'lasts no longer than the power relations capable of holding individual interests together' (Bourdieu, 1977: 65) . Later he would view the family as a symbolic non-aggression pact in which the parties forego the use of violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 145) . For its members the family is to be primarily understood as a means to accumulate symbolic capital, to assure the lineage, to accumulate affi nes, an instrument by which patriarchs perpetuate their power. Women's submission derives from their objectivity as exchangeable tokens in the service of expanding the symbolic capital of men who rule those families and are locked in agonistic competition with one another (Bourdieu, 2001: 42-44) . The right to compete for honor, and hence maleness, is the basis of male solidarity. 
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Power has primacy. Love, which Bourdieu invokes mindful of the risks of 'comic pedantry', is to be understood as a fragile, 'miraculous truce', a 'suspension of power relations'. He writes:
… the loving subject can obtain recognition only from another subject, but one which, like himself or herself, abdicates the intention of dominating. He or she freely hands his or her freedom to a master who in turn hands over his or her own, coinciding with him or her in an act of free alienation that is indefi nitely asserted (through the non-redundant repetition of 'I love you'). He or she has the experience of being a quasi-divine creator who makes, ex nihilo, the beloved, through the power that she or he grants him or her …; but a creator who … accepts to be the creature of his creature. (Bourdieu, 2001: 112) Love is here constituted by its distance from domination. Love, for Bourdieu, is an extraordinary exchange of power, a historically recent form of mutual recognition which, echoing Max Weber's original insight, has become the 'secular substitute for God'.
Bourdieu gives primacy to the miraculous cessation of mutual objectifi cation, rather than another possibility: love's necessary role in mutual subjectifi cation, in the recognition, and indeed production, of shared singularity. 4 Bourdieu constitutes sexual difference between man and woman not in genital function, in the making of life, but in the power relation between them. The anatomical difference between male and female sex organs, 'in particular', he argues, is the mark of male power and the medium for its legitimation (Bourdieu, 2001: 11, 15) . And the super-ordination of men vis a vis women is grounded in the subordination of biological to social reproduction, of the making of bodies to the accumulation of power, of the private domestic to the public offi cial spheres (Bourdieu, 2001: 46-47) .
That this power differential does not exhaust the meaning of masculinity, and hence of sexual anatomy and the sexualization of the social, is indicated by the very Kabyle ethnographic materials Bourdieu presents in this volume. The 'phallus', Bourdieu contends, 'concentrates all the collective fantasies of fecundating potency' (Bourdieu, 2001: 12) . Yet, as Bourdieu himself shows, it is what men share sexually with women that is emphasized by the Kayle metaphorical order-the generative swelling of the penis, the womb and the breast ('the fullness of life'), between the egg and the testicle-not their differences. This Kabyle schema itself emphasizes the life-giving powers of both men and women. That it is not sexed indicates that power relations, here condensed in the marking of the male sexual act, do not exhaust the meanings they accord to sexuality.
The primacy given to male penetration is an expression of masculine power. However, life-giving powers are neither arbitrary in their anatomy, nor do they neatly convert to the power of men over women, a transmuting, as Bourdieu claims, of 'social nomos into a necessity of nature (phusis)' (Bourdieu, 2001: 13) . 5 In fact, the Kabyle myth locates masculine primacy in historical time, preserving an earlier moment when it was women who
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showed men what their sexual organs were good for and how good it felt (Bourdieu, 2001: 18) . Life-giving pleasure, including the knowledge of fi re, predates masculine domination. The Kabyle story preserves this original female gift. If the sexual act becomes an act of masculine domination of bodies; it does not begin as one in the Kabyle narrative. It begins rather as a giving of fl esh. Kabyle myth does not ground male power in genital function; quite the contrary; it makes the sexed body into a site for the expression of power, but never reducible to it. To be a man is to pursue honor, to be unwomanly, to be defi ned by one's distance from that sexed position, to be in the company of only other men who pursue that honor. The Kabyle story perhaps preserves not one code, but two, the power that women take in mutual pleasure as opposed to the pleasure that men take in power, indeed a power that Bourdieu makes the center of his theory of practice. The Kabyle themselves suggest that masculine domination overwrites mutual pleasure, power over love.
Bourdieu, who recognizes the historicity of seemingly natural differences appears to take as the nature of the social, and the nature of the sexual, that very historical act of male sexual domination. Domination, as he says, is the 'better part' (Bourdieu, 2001: 33) . Men, he declares, understood and understand sexuality as 'an aggressive and essentially physical act of conquest oriented towards penetration and orgasm' (Bourdieu, 2001: 20) . Bourdieu, like Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, here eroticizes power over bodies as the core of sexuality (Bourdieu, 2001: 20-21) . Arbitrary gendered relations of power are the ground of sexual relations of desire, such that gendered organization of domination 'creates, organizes, expresses and directs desire-male desire as the desire for possession, eroticized domination, and female desire as the desire for masculine domination…' (Bourdieu, 1998: 21) . 6 Bourdieu here understands male pleasure in female pleasure as a power to give pleasure. Erotic love has a kind of sadomasochistic logic.
There are alternatives to domination as the primary term by which to understand the erotic relation as world-and subject-making, and hence their co-implication. Psychoanalysis points to the way in which ego-ideals subjectify through an imaginary identifi cation based on love (Widick, 2003) . 7 In Socrates' philosophy, love is a 'giving birth in beauty', a mutual birthing of beautiful life which is the ground of law-making and justice (Plato, 1999: 43) . And in Marion's phenomenology, erotic love is critical to the individualization of subject formation (Marion, 2007) . That Bourdieu makes erotic love into a domain of instrumental mastery is integrally related to the ways in which he gives primacy to domination as the modality and meaning of practice in his theory of fi elds.
Bourdieu's Endless Fields
A number of prominent sociologists have urged organizational theorists to deploy Bourdieu's approach to organizational fi elds (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Swartz, 2008 Organization 16(6) Articles individuals nor structuralist logic, Bourdieu's theory of fi elds at fi rst looks eminently promising as a base for thinking institutionally . The 'practical world' derives from the joining of an incorporated habitus and a fi eld, each of which is organized around 'already realized ends' (Bourdieu, 1990b: 53) .
With his identifi cation of the institutional sources of practical logic, his statement in The Logic of Practice looks like a clarion call for institutional theory:
[T]he dualistic vision that recognizes only the self-transparent act of consciousness or the externally determined thing has to give way to the real logic of action, which brings together two objectifi cations of history, objectifi cation in bodies and objectifi cation in institutions or, which amounts to the same thing, two states of capital, objectifi ed and incorporated …. (Bourdieu, 1990b: 57) Institutional fi elds are relatively autonomous games, arenas each with their own gravitational logic, zones in which particular forms of capital have effi cacy in the pursuit of that which is at stake in the game (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97-101) . The logic of a fi eld is overwhelmingly defi ned by its distributive possibilities between groups of people differentially positioned within it, the stances and strategies those positions afford, and the conditions of access to those positions and the capitals they command. Bourdieu neo-structurally locates capitals in the relations between positions, not as substantial objects possessed by interacting individuals, groups or organizations Capitals only exist in relation to particular fi elds whose profi ts they command. The limits of a fi eld are defi ned by the limits of effi cacy of particular forms of capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 101) . While Bourdieu's fi elds are regional economies, they are not contractarian, exchange-based, markets. While Bourdieu understands practice as interested behaviour, he does not posit fi elds as markets whose inner structure is revealed by aggregated exchange between rational subjects. Because the world socially distributes different kinds of resources, the probabilities of access to and return from them, and a sense of these objective potentialities is inscribed in individuals, individuals both tend to see the social world as natural and self-evident, and can instinctively do what must be done. Unlike the neo-classical subject who is prospectively rational, Bourdieu's interested agent is retrospectively rational, choosing choices that make sense, avoiding potentially valuable information that would change one's sense of things (Bourdieu, 1990b: 61) . Historicized 'rules of thumb' economize, even at the cost of preventing individuals from seizing unanticipated chances, even seeing new regularities. Under conditions of equilibrium, one protects one's sense of reality against anomaly or contradiction. Prospective rationality, refl exive estimation of future chances, refl ects conditions where the returns to such estimation are high, that is, positions of 'power over the economy' (Bourdieu, 1990b: 64) . It is, via habitus, a theory of non-conscious rational expectations. 
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Unlike neo-classical economics and rational-choice theorists, tastes-or preferences-are endogenous to the model, derived from the principles of habitus and the constraints of positional resources. In the fi eld of culture, income effects on preference orderings are mediated through tastes. Those richer in cultural capital and poorer in economic capital, for example, prefer cultural practices which are 'culturally most legitimate and economically cheapest', like avant-garde theatre. It is not just a question of costs and means: … [T] hrough the relationship between the material costs and the expected 'cultural' benefi t, each fraction expresses its conception of what specifi cally makes the value of the work of art and of the legitimate way of appropriating it. (Bourdieu, 1984: 269-270) In his study of cultural consumption, Bourdieu is interested in groupspecifi c tastes, as they are homologously related to a structure of positions, not in global prices that derive from the aggregation of exchanges. Preferences are adapted to the logic of structure, as group-specific dispositions, or principles of action, produced by that structure. Habitus, not exchange, is the ground of a fi eld's equilibrium. The appearance of means-end rationality, that the consequences of practice appear as the motivation of that practice, is a consequence of the fact that practices, including those in the market, and the specifi c valuations immanent within them, are ordered by habitus deriving from one's position in the structure, and are reproduced across time (Bourdieu, 1977: 72-78) . Through habitus people want what they have a chance of getting and learn instinctively how to get what is possible (Bourdieu, 1990b: 57 ). Bourdieu's approach, in part, here recalls Gary Becker who daringly sought to make preferences endogenous in the neo-classical model, arguing that individuals choose preferences based on resource endowments that allow them to maximize their utility. The implication is that when neo-classical economic theory takes the distribution of resources and preferences as un-theorized, independent and exogenous constraints, it is genetically incapable of understanding a market. And in fact although, like utility-maximizing rational-actor models, Bourdieu's use of correspondence analysis assumes an equilibrium mediated through habitus, he is most interested in dimensionalizing valuations as these are distributed among groups, not in a derivation of price or power from volumes of exchange (Breiger, 2000) . Rational choice theorists seek to specify a temporal process so as to derive its moments; Bourdieu rather seeks to describe a social space, a social cartography, structures of difference between agonistic groups who maintain heterogeneous valuations associated with the different positions they occupy within a fi eld.
In every fi eld practice is always-appearance to the contrary-interested behaviour (Bourdieu, 1977: 65, 76) . Interest is dual in Bourdieu's theory, one that is a relation to means, the real aim and ground of action, and another, a relation to ends, that is derivative from and sustained by competition Organization 16(6) Articles over the fi rst. The fi rst interest is given by one's position in the distribution of economic, social and cultural capitals effective in particular fi elds and the subject's dispositions which internalize or incorporate the principles of relevance and sense of the game given by that position. In each fi eld the primary interest is the accumulation of this capital and maximization of its return.
Scientifi c capital, for example, is composed scientifi c authority based on competency as recognized by peers, and social authority as delegated by organizations, in this case universities or grandes Écoles. A scientifi c choice is, Bourdieu argues, a 'social strategy of investment aimed at maximizing the specifi c profi t, inseparably political and scientifi c, provided by the fi eld …' (Bourdieu, 1991: 8) . The movement of scientifi c knowledge is not given, à la Kuhn, by the immanent logic of knowledge, or even knowledgemaking, by a symbolic order or the substantive rationality of practice, but by the struggle between agents each seeking to defi ne science such that it 'best conforms to their specifi c interest, that is, the one best suited to preserving or increasing their specifi c capital' (Bourdieu, 1991: 12) .
The other interest in a fi eld, that one is invested in the 'specifi c goal' at stake in a fi eld, and hence 'interested', Bourdieu terms the illusio, 'a fundamental belief in the interest of the game and the value of the stakes which is inherent in … membership' (Bourdieu, 2000: 11) . It is through the conjunction of one's habitus, including the internalizations and investments necessary to enter a fi eld, and the struggles of the fi eld, that the ends at stake in the fi eld are constituted, not as such, but nevertheless impose themselves 'with absolute necessity and self-evidence' (Bourdieu, 2000: 151) . Membership in the fi eld generates a struggle for domination within it, which Bourdieu understands not only as the principle of its historical transformation, but as the primary guarantee of the arbitrary value of this other 'interest'.
Those who have capitals in common also internalize a common habitus which generates common tastes or preferences which generate competition for the resources whose distribution shaped the habitus in the fi rst place (Bourdieu, 1998: 25) .
9 Kabyle men, for example, learn honor as an unquestionable stake, which generates competition for honour, which maintains the illusion that honour is 'natural' both to the world and to men. It is no different in culture, modern science or the state. Competition naturalizes the arbitrariness, the illusio that those stakes have value (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98, 117) . Belief in the value of culture, for example derives from the struggle over culture. And what drives the struggle? Bourdieu writes:
Culture is a stake which, like all social stakes, simultaneously presupposes and demands that one take part in the game and be taken in by it; and interest in culture, without which there is no race, no competition, is produced by the very race and competition which it produces. The value of culture, the supreme fetish, is generated in the initial investment implied by the mere fact of entering the game, joining in the collective belief in the value of the game and endlessly remakes the competition for the stakes. (Bourdieu, 1984: 250) The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu Roger Friedland
The ends here are illusory, given by entry into the game, by competition, by being 'taken in by the game' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98) . The drive for distinction, homo hierarchicus, does not see itself, usually has no need to see itself, as such, or what it objectively is: 'the transfi gured, misrecognizable, legitimate form of social class' (Bourdieu, 1984: 250) . The critical moment-entering the game-is not at issue, following, as it does in this case, from class habitus. The value of a fi eld, the illusio, is here sociologically derived from a disposition derived from one's position in a distribution of means. The real, misrecognized meaning of practices is the contribution they make to one's position in the distributional struggle over means.
In the fi eld of science, Bourdieu likewise refuses the notion that the scientifi c community is organized around the end of scientifi c truth, 'a pure and perfect competition of ideas' (Bourdieu, 1991: 7) . Scientifi c reason derives neither from 'ideal norms', nor from 'the technical rules of a scientifi c methodology', but from struggle for dominance in which reason is a medium through which agents struggle to secure dominance and command the profi ts of the fi eld. The dominants of the fi eld are able to defi ne scientifi c knowledge such that the scientifi c capital they have most in abundance occupies a privileged position in the accepted practice of knowing. Truth is an interest because it is a medium for domination. Because reason is a self-interest in the struggle the struggle advances the production of reason. Power is the reason to know, which is pursued through reason.
In the state, too, the struggle for power secures the purpose of this fi eld. Bourdieu grounds institutional fi elds primarily in the struggles of agents and groups, not the purposes of organizations. Thus the state, he argues, should not be understood fi rst as an apparatus or prime mover with a purpose, but as a fi eld of antagonistic agents whose 'apparent orientation toward a common function … are born of confl ict and competition, not some kind of immanent self-development of the structure' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 103) . The state, as a fi eld of struggle, generates an energy that must be captured by the sovereign. 'The principle of the perpetual movement that stirs the fi eld', Bourdieu writes of the absolutist French state, 'does not lie in some prime mover-here, the Sun King-but in the struggle itself, which is produced by the constitutive structures of the fi eld, and tends to reproduce its structures and hierarchies' (Bourdieu, 2000: 153) . The modern French state is itself formed out of the successful efforts of a corporate group, successors of the noblesse de robe, elites endowed only with cultural capital-knowledge gleaned in education-who were formed conjointly with the formation of the state, who 'had indeed to create the state in order to create itself as holder of a legitimate monopoly on state power' (Bourdieu, 1998: 22) . The public interest-'the modern ideology of public services, of common welfare and commonweal' that would 'inspire the French Revolution … was invented collectively', he writes '… by the class of the robe' (Bourdieu, 1998: 24) . In their struggle with the noblesse d'épée, the clergy and the bourgeoisie, this corporate group was able to lay Organization 16(6) Articles claim to the state by universalizing its 'particular interests', by inventing the universal in whose objectifi cation their power resided. Just as in science, the struggle for domination between agents, between groups, not only sets a fi eld in motion, but objectifi es its telos. The public interest of the state is a refraction of a private group interest, which must realize its power through it. Like reason, the universal is a medium of power.
Bourdieu believes that fi elds follow 'invariant laws', deriving from their homologous logics (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 75) . This scope, however, comes at a cost. The homology derives from grounding the social in group relations, and the dynamism of social change from the struggle for group dominance, groups arrayed according to their differential relation to different forms of capital variably objectifi ed in the positions they occupy in the fi eld. Bourdieu's theory of fi elds is a political-economics of power. Fields are all structures of power with differential command over 'the specifi c profi ts that are at stake in the fi eld …' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97 ). An institutional fi eld is a structure of positional power, or as Emirbayer and Johnson, who endorse the re-politicization of organizational theory that Bourdieu's approach makes possible, note approvingly, '…a temporary state of power relations within what is … an ongoing struggle for domination over the fi eld' (2008: 6; see also Swartz, 2008: 48) .
Through his multiplication of capitals, Bourdieu converts Weber's distinct spheres of class, status and power to a common conceptual metric.
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In the pre-capitalist order, honour or status is symbolic capital, a form of credit or authority which is but a misrecognized form of economic capital, a 'denied capital, recognized as legitimate' (Bourdieu, 1990b: 118) . Under conditions of late modernity, culture, credentialed and consumed, becomes a capital, the basis, once again of symbolic power. Culture, and the drive for cultural distinction, is but 'the transfi gured, misrecognizable, legitimate form of social class' (Bourdieu, 1984: 250) . The contest over control of legitimate violence-Weber's criterion for state power-becomes likewise the 'struggle to accumulate symbolic capital' (Bourdieu, 1977: 40, 60-61; 1989: 136) . Bourdieu ultimately became indifferent about the terminological difference between power and capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97, 99) . Effi cacious resources in the most performative sector of the state-the judiciary-are referred to as 'juridical capital' (Bourdieu, 1992: 99) .
To homologize the relation between dominant and dominated across fi elds requires institutional homogenization. In Bourdieu's work, every resource-economic, social, cultural, information-becomes another form of capital, every fi eld another 'market'. Economic capital is the dominant form, the underlying principle of homology. Class, he writes, is a 'universal principle of explanation and classifi cation, defi ning the rank occupied in all possible fi elds' (Bourdieu, 1984: 114) . Seeking to develop a general economy of practice, Bourdieu economizes all realms of social life in which one invests, develops credit, and reaps profi ts. Public identifi cation with the group, for example, is a 'symbolic tax', honour 'symbolic surplus value' (Bourdieu, 1977: 95, 195 The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu Roger Friedland doxa by relying on folk categories in the construction of our theoretical objects, yet he himself imports the dominant fi elds-capitalism and the bureaucratic state-into the analytic categories-capital and power-by which we understand all fi elds. Bourdieu thus reproduces the dominance of the dominant institutions.
It is only because Bourdieu has homogenized the principle of practice across fi elds-the binary of domination-that he can homologize groups across fi elds (Bourdieu, 1990b: 72; 1984: 254; 1969) . While, for example, Bourdieu historically locates a new modern source of class power and legitimacy in cultural capital, that culture remains a media for power, not its content. The several capitals are ultimately convertible in the 'division in the labor of domination' (Bourdieu, 1996: 265; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 99) . Accumulation of capital is a trans-historical mode of reproducing domination within a fi eld, this 'will to power' being the content of interest within every fi eld. And the 'fi eld of power' is the 'gaming space' in which holders of these diverse forms of power, the dominant groups within each fi eld, struggle over which will be the dominant form of power, the exchange rate between them, and hence the 'dominant principle of domination' (Bourdieu, 1996: 264-265) .
Unlike Foucault, for whom discipline is a technology, composed locally through mechanisms colonized and assembled in a plurality of sites with no determinative social origin or institutional locus, for Bourdieu the state is the central medium by which legitimate classifi cation is accomplished and imposed, 'a bank of symbolic capital, that guarantees all acts of authority' (Bourdieu, 1998: 51; Foucault, 1979) . The modern state, Bourdieu writes:
… possesses the means of imposition and inculcation of the durable principles of vision and division that conform to its own structure, is the site par excellence of the concentration of symbolic power. (1998: 47) Because he locates the origin of the dominant vision in the political victories of dominant groups, whose domination rests on their constitution of the state, the modern state, too, becomes a culturally empty form, an instrument for the institution of categorical knowledge, a monopoly medium for universalizing and naturalizing knowledge, a cognitive machine which plays a central role in the 'division of labor of domination' (Bourdieu, 1998: 58) . In Bourdieu's vision of the social, the substantive content of the universal-justice, truth, progress, goodness, grace, honour, rationality, effi ciency, democracy-is not of sociological import.
The logic of practice is dominated by an agonistic, instrumental distributional struggle over institutional means, not a common striving to produce substantive ends. Fields are organized as struggles over the relative powers of capitals, which are, in reality, struggles over power, over what it is and by implication who is powerful. In Bourdieu's hands the multiplicity of institutional ends is subsumed into a unicity of means, so many powers over which groups struggle in their pursuit of legitimate dominance. Power, or Organization 16(6) Articles authority, is the real misrecognized meta-stake organizing each fi eld, such that the value, or stake, in any given fi eld is an illusio, a psychic and material investment in the game, a sense of relevance given by a habitus conditioned by the kinds of capital with which one is endowed, and the playing of 'the game' itself (Bourdieu, 1990b: 66; Widick, 2003) . The social is reduced to a political poiesis, a set of interlocking production-functions of power, sustained by distributive competition over this empty cell of power. Power operates through culture, but is not itself cultural. Bourdieu assimilates the logic of signifi cation to that of domination, thereby de-culturalizing power, so that capital will serve just as well. Bourdieu can assimilate the logic of signifi cation to that of domination because it is group confl ict, not institutional contradiction, which stands as the motor of social order and history.
Beyond Distribution: The Institutional Logic of Practice
Bourdieu is not a crypto-Marxist as is sometimes claimed. Marx's theory of capitalism has an institutional specifi city; Bourdieu's does not. In Marxist theory capital is an internally contradictory relation, interlocked practices of production and exchange, a relation between labor and money which is culturally phenomenalized as a thing. Capital is constituted both materially and symbolically, in the reciprocal chains of conversion of use into exchange, an internally contradictory relation constitutive of profi t, the source of capitalist expansion and economic crisis both. Distribution follows from and ultimately contradicts the logic of capitalist production, governed by an unobservable, but presumed real, law of value. Capital is a practical, temporal relation between production and circulation, not an objectifi ed thing.
Capitalists may convert position into disposition, but the logic of capitalism does not in Marxism derive from this incorporation. Bourdieu writes of the several capitals as though they were a 'pile of tokens of different colors, each color corresponding to a given species of capital she holds …' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 99) . For Marx capital is neither thing, nor 'token': 'It' does not exist. Although capital appears as something one has; in Marx's theory, it is a relationship one does, a practical relation enacting a substance, in his case value.
Marxist theorists traditionally derided those who emphasize distributional struggle over the share of profi ts as opposed to wages as the critical engine of capitalist development, as opposed to the logic of commodifi cation and systemic tensions between money, labour and use as metrics of value. For Marxists, the internally contradictory capital-labor relation, not the distribution of capitals, creates the stake, sets the fi eld in motion, and shapes its relation with other fi elds. With Bourdieu, the neo-Ricardian, the distributional struggle appears as the prime mover of history, and of the changing relation between fi elds. It is the distribution of the several capitals which is decisive. He writes: 
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The task of science is to uncover the structure of the distribution of species of capital which tends to determine the structure of individual or collective stances taken, through the interests and dispositions it conditions. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 114) The objective relations among positions he is referring to are ranks in a distribution of capitals or powers. Social theory has likewise tended to focus on this structural question, the legitimate distributions of the good as opposed to the systemic question of the legitimacy and practical logic of goods, on who gets what as opposed to what and how the goods are produced.
Although distributional contests do sustain the value of institutional values, the institutional logic of practice is otherwise. An institution's specifi city is located in the cultural premises of its production, not its distributions and groups positioned within that distribution. Institutions are not, as in the original statements of institutional theory, forms of social organization invested with value beyond their practical effects, or, as later work showed, with practical effects because they are legitimate net of their practicality (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) . They are themselves practical regimes of valuation, in the sense that they constitute institutional objects of value. Capitals, if we can use that term, are purposes before they are powers; indeed they are only powers because they are purposes, purposes constituted not only externally through difference, but internally through enactment and practical belief. Practice is constituted by that which it produces, of which, in fact, the producers are products.
Bourdieu's practice is not praxis, neither Marxist nor Aristotelian. For Marx, the specifi city of the human is located not in the production of power, but in the making of life, a making which historically remakes the makers and ultimately contradicts the institutional relations through which that life is made. Nor is Bourdieu's concept of practice Aristotelian, from whom it-and habitus as habitual disposition-originally derived. Aristotle distinguished between poeisis and praxis, which he also termed the distinction between production and action (Aristotle, 2004) . In the former, an act is derived instrumentally from an end external to the act, as in the case of a craftsman who uses his skill, or techné, to execute a preexisting plan for a chair. Word and act are related as a making. In praxis the standards of action are internal to the action and the goal of the action is the action itself. Word and act are related as a doing, or a performance.
Aristotle understood virtue, exercised by free men in the public sphere, as the privileged domain of action. Speaking of prudence, Aristotle noted, is not like science or production. 'For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the case of action, because the end is merely doing well' (Aristotle: 2004: 150) . Whereas poeisis is governed by a meansends logic; praxis is not. In praxis, subject and object are both immanent in the act, a prudent man practices prudence. Praxis, unlike production, is an internal, self-contained, order of action. In production, Aristotle says, the actuality of the making is in the thing being made; in action, the actuality Organization 16(6) Articles of action is located in the actor himself (Aristotle, 1998) . Bourdieu converts all the domains of Aristotle's praxis into production sites of power.
Institutions are constituted by orderings of means-ends couplets, regimes of practice, what I have called 'institutional logics', that is, stable constellations of practice, and the subjects and objects coupled to them (Friedland, 2009 (Friedland, , 2002 Friedland and Alford, 1991) . (See Thornton and Ocasio, 2008 for a review, critique and extension of institutional logic in organizational research.). Institutional objects are not ontologically objective. One cannot understand institutions by starting with an autonomous subject in an instrumental relation to an exterior object, a sovereign consciousness confronting a thing present-at-hand. The central objects of institutional life are meaningful, ready-at-hand in a particular way, that is, they only exist as collective representations, representations collectively accepted as real. Institutional practices are both media for subjectifi cation in that they enable and possess practitioners, and of objectifi cation in that those practices, and hence the subjects, hinge on their symbolic and performative production of the objects. It is through the institutional logic of practice that the two are co-constituted.
Every institutional resource allocation-of votes, money, property, force, knowledge, meals, love, territory, blessings and sacraments-is a material semiosis in which the categories, instruments, and agents through which that object is produced or distributed are brought to life and made real. All objects of institutional life are dually constituted, both conceptually and practically, as categories that point to objects of action, and actors who engage in material practices that enact them. Institutional objects, as such, do not exist. They are known only through their conjoint conceptual and practical specifi city (Breiger, 1974 (Breiger, , 2000 Mohr and Duquenne, 1997) . The constitution of the object is both causally and narratively linked to the practice, as that from which the practice is understood to derive. This interdependent duality of category and practice is the core of an institutional logic (Mohr and Duquenne, 1997; Mohr and White, 2008) .
Meaning is materially constituted at the same time that materiality is meaningfully constituted. Language's constitutive role is operative in every institutional domain (Searle, 1995 (Searle, , 2006 . Institutional languages constitute before they justify, and they can justify only because they constitute. Institutional language operates not truthfully through denotation, but performatively through the production of the real. One cannot interpret institutions by relying solely on words or on things, but by both as they are deployed in practice, in that categories point to the nature, and hence genesis, of an institutional object of which the material practice is productive or to which it is responsive. Material practices indexically fi x the referentially independent meanings of institutional languages, turning meanings into functions, signs into performances. Categories and practices are mutually constitutive, that is, categories are known by the practices applied to them just as much as practices only have sense in terms of the The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu Roger Friedland categories to which they are applied. An institutional logic exists when institutional objects have a practical specifi city and institutional practices have an objective specifi city.
Organizational researchers have pointed to the way new organizational practices reconstitute both the objects and the subjects of practice. In various domains major shifts in practice-nouvelle cuisine; relief organization, alternative dispute resolution, the HMO, recycling, brand wine, interest groups, the hospice-were tied to ontological changes in the meaning of a meal, marriage, health care, waste, wine, poverty, democracy and life itself, as (Clemens, 1993; Mohr and Duquenne, 1997; Monin et al., 2008; Morrill et al., 2007; McAdam and Scott, 2005) . It the corporate market place, Neil Fligstein has shown how the construction of the American fi rm sequentially changed from a site of production, to a seller of commodities, to a bundle of fi nancial assets, each of which has been associated with distinct practices, organizational forms and types of subjects thereby authorized to assume control over it (Fligstein, 1985 (Fligstein, , 1990 . Market structures and strategies derive from these alternative conceptions of control (Fligstein, 1990) . Patricia Thornton has shown the same thing with regard to American publishing fi rms, in which the book moved from a literary production in which editors had primacy to a marketable commodity in which managers had control (Thornton, 2004) . And Michael Lounsbury showed how new professional fi nance associations transformed the practices by which money was constituted through mathematical economics in the fi eld of fi nance in conjunction with governmental deregulation (Lounsbury, 2002 ). An institutional logic exists when material practice and ontology become tightly coupled.
Institutions are ideological formations, not just in the sense that they are organized around languages that legitimate power as control over persons and things, but in that they produce powers by authorizing practices that constitute subjects and objects through which the authority relation is organized. Institutional theory thus points beyond distribution, the classical ground of ideology and the theoretical center of Bourdieu's theory of fi elds-measured either as control over objective means or in transinstitutional operators like power, capital or utility-to the hegemonic construction of incommensurable self-referential domains of activity and the extent of their scope as the systemic, as opposed to structural, ground of ideology. Institutional fi elds are structures of symbolically constituted, iterated powers whose exercise through interlocked congeries of practicesvoting and legislating, buying and selling, offi ciating and participating in religious rite, marrying, cohabitation and love-making, the fi ghting of wars and signing of treaties, controlled experiment and observation-carried out by collectively recognized subjects-citizens, owners, congregants, families, offi cials, scientists-which presume and performatively produce values-democracy, property, divinity, love, sovereignty and knowledge.
I call these institutional substances, the central object of an institutional fi eld and the principle of its unity. The category derives from Aristotelian Organization 16(6) Articles metaphysics where substance, or substantial form, is the foundation, or essence, of a thing which cannot be reduced to its accidental properties which attach to it nor to the materiality of its instances (Aristotle, 1998) . For Aristotle, substance is not matter, but the form that makes matter a 'this', 'that by virtue of which the matter is in the state it is in' (Aristotle, 1998: 167, 229) . A substance exceeds its attributes, cannot be reduced to a thing's materiality, and thus cannot be described, only pointed to and named. Bourdieu explicitly aimed at moving beyond what he calls 'Aristotelian substantialism' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97) . While the category of substance may be epistemologically problematic, it captures institutional reality rather well. Like Aristotle's soul as the substance of human, an institutional substance does not exist; it is rather an absent presence necessary to institutional life. Institutional substances are unfounded, not because they are arbitrary and misrecognized media for empowerment-they are that too, but because they depend on practices of good faith.
Institutions are domains of praxis in the Aristotelian sense. Praxis lacks an ontologically objective object. Praxis is organized around ontologically subjective objects, objects that can only approximate appearance through practice, through acts of subjects whose actions and subjectivities depend on them. In praxis, subjectifi cation and objectifi cation are co-constitutive. The objects of praxis are not objects at all, but rather substances, nonobservable reasons that cannot be reduced to rationality or sense, that can only be phenomenalized through practice. One can never arrive at them; only repeat the approach through practice. By comparison to the presence of things, an institutional substance is an absent presence towards and around which practice incessantly moves, known only through this movement. Institutional logics are ontological enactments, a what done through a how, popular sovereignty through democratic election, justice through juridical practices that classify actions according to the binary of legal and illegal, divinity through pilgrimage and prayer, romantic love through intimate exchange of body and word. Institutional logics depend on making the invisible substance visible. Institutional practices are the visible face and the condition of possibility of institutional substances, and hence the source of their identity across time.
Institutions are not primarily structures of power whose purposes are analytically external to their constitution. Institutional logics are not, as in Bourdieu, fi rst ordered by the distributive struggle over capitals that sustain the stake as an illusio, in which categorical oppositions are arbitrary transpositions of positional oppositions. Institutions have a logic because practices and substances are internally co-constitutive. Deontic powers-authorizations and obligations-trace out the logic of practice with respect to a purpose, a value, or in my terms, a substance, the most general 'function' in an institutional fi eld. These institutional de-ontologies rest on their ontologies, the institutional content of power. Substances are known through their powers, but are not reducible to them.
As every prophet knows, divinity cannot be reduced to church practice, but neither can it be divorced from it either. Institutional life requires us to act as if we believe in the value and, in fact, we tend to refuse to reduce it-knowledge, property, sovereignty, love, let alone divinity-to the practices that index, perform, produce and distribute it. Because substances are indeterminate and excessive to the practices, practices can be contested and change without necessarily transforming the substance which is their ground. Institutional practices come in congeries, a symbolizing skein whose self-referential interlocking helps substantiate that institutional logic. While ontological transformations require new regimes of practice, belief in the objectivity of the substance also affords space in which new practices can be added and subtracted, and yet still legitimately claim to index the same substance. Institutional logics are unstable orders. The open, even dialectical, relation between substance and practice-between transcendence and immanence-whose effects thinkers have a tendency to either absolutize as idealism, the infl uence of analytically separable values or categories, or materialism, the infl uence of control over the analytically separable materialities of practice-is a critical source of agency and institutional change.
Situations, organizations and even fi elds are always composite (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006) , sometimes by design (Stark, 2008) .
11 Beyond the contingent relation between substance and practice, contest is also possible because individuals live across institutional fi elds and because situations and organizations involve more than one logic of practice, so that actors can engage, as Boltanski and Thévenot put it, in 'attributing value to the common good of a different polity' and so contest 'the very reality of the common good underlying the legitimacy of the test [of worth] ….' (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 219, 223) . Like my own approach, their conventions of valuation were developed in opposition to what they saw as the institutional poverty of Bourdieu's power-centric social world. Although there are many parallels with Boltanski and Thévenot's original work on plural conventions of equivalence, or 'orders of worth'-which I have just begun to study, I would argue that institutions, unlike situations, have an ontological specifi city, such that their central substances become bases for evaluation and coordination, as well as hierarchical ordering, for determining those who are more or less 'worthy'.
Boltanski and Thévenot's conventions of equivalence, and the material, embodied practices through which they are enacted, are intentionally conceptualized so as to be transposable across institutional domains.
12 So, for example, while they fi nd its template in the receipt of divine grace in Augustine's City of God, the world of worth they 'compose' to account for its 'harmonies' is organized around a more general logic of 'inspiration', an involuntary, immeasurable, uniqueness characterized by affective relations of 'creation' (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 159-164) . In this inspired world, the 'relevant beings are, for example, spirits, crazy people, artists, children', not to mention creative executives (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 370) . The institutional specifi city of divine grace is not germane to Organization 16(6) Articles their conceptualization. Or in what they call 'the domestic world,' which 'does not unfold inside the circle of family relationships alone,' worth is given by one's position in habit-based, embodied generational hierarchies of personal dependence which climax at the point of origin, or engenderment, around the fi gure of a 'father' who incarnates tradition (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 164-178) . Leaders, like fathers, 'constitute the very being of less worthy,' such that leaders and followers are of 'the same fl esh' manifest in relations of pride, shame and respect that bind them (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 171) . Domestic worth is found not just in families and households, but potentially in any milieu or 'respectable social group,' particularly professions. These grammars of worth, which sometimes do have a home domain, are constructed so as to transcend it. This is due both to the primacy of situation, particularly situations of critique in which these are deployed, but also, I suspect, because their framework is organized around hierarchies of worth among 'beings', whereas my own is anchored in institutionally specifi c production of substances, from which hierarchies derive.
Actual institutional fields are always admixtures, affording space for agentic deployment and expansion of practices alien to the core, to remix authority and exchange, regulation and competition, to use a classic example. But I still believe that institutions have central practical tendencies and the most important politics are those that shift institutional boundaries. We should distinguish between shifts in the institutional architecture of society as opposed to the social architecture of institutions, that is, the difference between extending an institutional logic to a new domain of activity, such as the commodifi cation of health care or the religionization of state authority, from the social extension or contraction of access to practices that follow existent institutional logic to different groups of people, such as the civil rights movement, feminist incorporations of women or micro-lending, although these distributional shifts may involve institutional shifts elsewhere, as, for example, in the case of the promotion of civil and political equality for women. The movement of African captives and the prerogatives of rule out of the category of property-that is, the end of slavery and the rise of state bureaucracy-were distributional struggles because they were confl icts over institutional boundaries. Giving primacy to the former occludes the determining importance of the latter.
God, Love and Institutional Logic
Institutional substances are unfounded and unfoundable. Institutional logics are religious, not as secularizations, but as enactments of transcendent substances immanent to them. Like an unknowable God, a substance is known through its enactments, its operations, the practices which presume it. Institutional substances cannot be directly observed, but, like a transcendent God immanent to all His creation, are immanent in the practices that organize an institutional fi eld, values never exhausted The Endless Fields of Pierre Bourdieu Roger Friedland by those practices, practices premised on faith. Institutions invoke their substances in language; they repeat names. They are not, for all that, loosely coupled ceremonial legitimating exteriors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) , but unquestioned, constitutive interiors, the sacred core of each fi eld, unobservable, but socially real. Unlike lesser institutional objects, they are the God-terms of social life, the limited set of things 'for the sake of which' we live our lives, what Augustine referred to as that thing which is 'enjoyed,' or loved for its own sake, unchangeable, eternal and majestic-obviously the Trinitarian God in his case-as opposed to those changeable and uncertain things which are loved because they enable one to possess other objects, and hence not enjoyed, but used (frui vs. uti) (Heidegger, 2004: 203-205) . Institutional substance is the unobservable purpose of a fi eld.
Like religion, an institution's practices are ontologically rational, that is tied to a substance indexed by the conjunction of a practice and a name. An institutional substance is the highest, most general value in a fi eld. Prayer to God is not so different from the realization of profi t, which is, after all, an accounting convention derived from monetized property rights. Property does not exist in itself, but is rather a substance immanent to the exercise of a set of rights, which are themselves created ex nihilo by the state. Like God, one can never know the substance in itself, either through one's senses or through one's reason. Institutions all depend, not on illusio, but on faith in the substances around which their practices are organized. Every institution is a religious institution: a linked set of practices, subjects and an unobservable substance that joins the two.
Transcendence and eternity are immanent within praxis, in that their 'objects' both exceed and outlive the finite persons whose practice approaches them in that they are given from elsewhere, institutional transpersonal cultural objects that depend on others for their enactment, on a prior and projected history of enactment. And like a God beyond being, that is a God not modeled in the mirror of a human being, as a superior being, these objects are transcendent substances, anonymous, beyond predication, neither true nor false (Carlson, 1999) . Eternity is immanent to institutional praxis because the substance must be perpetually enacted, or signifi ed, through practice in order to exist at all. It also entails the possibility of idolatry because members-and analysts-are apt to confl ate practice and substance, to reduce substance to human purpose.
In closing, I want to suggest that such an institutionalism also requires us to think beyond domination as the machine language of the social, indeed to posit love as a trope to theorize the social. This institutionalism implies that the world loves us in a multiplicity of ways. Let me explain. Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology makes eroticization of the fl esh critical to love, to an individualization through fl esh and oaths received from and given to the other (Marion, 2007: 126-129, 176) . Is from an other, from such others, that one is given one's fl esh, one's individuality, one's person, one's 'proper ipseity', indeed an assurance that one's being is lovable because Organization 16(6) Articles one is and has been a lover (Marion, 2007: 195) . There is a sense in which institutional logics follow this phenomenological logic of love, in which it is you who are given through its practice, called into being through its substance. Like the beloved, whose distance, her alterity, both enables and requires you to repeatedly give yourself and that sustains her as an 'object' of desire, institutional substances are the goods that possess you much more than you will ever possess them precisely because you can never have them as objects, only perform, or 'do', them as substances. They are the absent presences that matter. Institutional substances-whether love, justice, popular sovereignty, God, property, beauty or truth-individualize you precisely through this lack, not as exterior objects you possess, but as transcendent substances that 'possess' you by the very condition of your never being able to possess them, and hence to which you give yourself over and over again, things you cannot lose because you can never have them. Institutional logics work not by a psychoanalytic logic where the desired object is forbidden and hence internalized in misrecognized form. One rather gives oneself as to a beloved whom one can never possess, never access, and one is thereby given oneself by these substances who afford you a subjective interiority, a me, a particular self who loves this or that, who is afforded his status as a lover, his very wordliness, his creative capacity for world-making, by the world.
Objects can exist in their exteriority; substances must be interior to exist at all. Objects can be objectifi ed; substances can only subjectify those whose practice is organized by them. Institutional substances are the world's beloveds, around which modalities of loving are organized by which one is loved, afforded, given by the world. To reduce substances to objects, to identify them with their objectifi cations, is both to fetishize and destroy them, for they depend on their distance, on their living eternality, their incommensurability and immeasurability. Institutional substances are places where one will never arrive and that draw you by their distance, that inhabit you by the interiorization necessary to their enactment. Institutional logics depend on incarnation, not just incorporation. In institutional life the word is made fl esh and the fl esh made word, across an institutional transom of immanentization and transcendentalization.
Perhaps the phenomenological structure of love, the impossibility of imposing one's signifi cation upon another without effacing the other, without objectifying the other, is part of logic of world-making. But perhaps this is because love is an outworking of the institutional logic of the worldhood in which we are given to ourselves by these substances that exceed us, that this institutionally iconic form of our givenness becomes abstracted, such that the incorporation of places of culture is transformed into a structure of mutual giving of persons. I want to close with this opening, the co-implication of loving another being and being loved into being by the world. Not just domination, but love, too, may animate institutional life. Bourdieu (1990: 41) . 3 For the origin of the distinction between class distinctive parties and politically distinct classes, see Alford (1963) . 4 There is also the issue of other dimensions of boundary construction and the relationship of aesthetics to them. For example, Michele Lamont, in her comparison of the construction of symbolic boundaries by the French and American upper-middle classes, has shown the importance of moral boundaries in both countries. Lamont criticizes Bourdieu for not only neglecting moral boundaries, but for subordinating them to the interested hierarchicalization of socioeconomic and cultural criteria. Lamont fi nds that in fact there is no relationship between mobility and the practice of moral exclusion (Lamont, 1992) . 5 And Bourdieu knows it as he here refers to the 'structural ambiguity '(2001: 12) . 6 Green, who creatively uses Bourdieu's theory to prove 'a social cosmology of eroticized objects,' forwards the concept of an 'erotic habitus', 'the unconscious somatization of the social order' as a way to theorize the social forms of libidinal investment, sexual fantasy as imaginary investments in particular objects (2008: 599, 614) . Not surprisingly Green's analysis and cases center on erotic objects, and hence the subject as a social object, constituted through domination, such as the unloved, lesbian Chicana who declares, 'In the effort not to feel fucked, I became the fucker, even with woman' or the Latino homosexual who was excited by '[r]ough sex with white men in adult bookstores' as a way to 'getting revenge, sort of like getting into the White world ' (2008: 617, 620 ).. 7 Widick shows the way the fi gure of the 'Super Trader' operates as an imaginary ego-ideal on the fl oor of an options trading fl oor of the Pacifi c Exchange. 'As they learn to trade from their peers and their texts, the Super Trader rises, offering its character as a partial substitute, a helpful addition to the subject's imaginary-that is, to its ego, its ongoing embodiment of the social imaginary ' (2003:715) . 8 Ron Breiger shows the ways in which the rational-choice theorist James Coleman and Bourdieu are both fi eld theorists whose mathematical matrix techniques presume equilibrium as an attribute of the fi eld (Breiger, 2000) . Coleman dually infers power and value through the magnitudes of resources exchanged between agents with different exogenous desires who control them in which equilibrium values or prices are derived from the volumes of their exchanges. Coleman derives single dimensions of powers of individuals and values of events from the interaction of matrices of exogenously given and independent control and desire. Bourdieu, in contrast, derives structures of difference in a fi eld based not on the volumes of resources exchanged, but from the similarities of particularly positioned individuals' practices from which he infers latent groups and their respective valuations (2000: 108). As Breiger pointed out to me, although both operate from matrix eigenvectors, 'Coleman's single dimension (power, when applied to people; value, when applied to events) is Organization 16(6) Articles essentially about the "size" of actors (or events), whereas Correspondence Analysis, used by Bourdieu, "nets out" sheer size, and therefore focuses on dimensions that represent the joint patterning of relations among individuals and properties' (email from Ron Breiger to author, April 12, 2009). Bourdieu, in fact, is uninterested in the fi rst dimension of the interaction matrix which captures individuals' capital volumes, rather centering his studies around the second dimension which captures the modalities, or practices, in which differently positioned individuals engage. Bourdieu infers the structure of power from the heterogeneity of valuations and principles of action corollary to distributions of resources. 9 Bourdieu avoids the categories of voluntarist social theory, eschewing 'subject' in preference for 'agent'. With regard to 'preference,' however, part of the neo-classical lingua franca, he is quite comfortable, easily associating 'taste' and 'preference' (Bourdieu, 1998: 25; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 84) 10 See John Hall's insightful essay where he seeks to reverse Bourdieu's derivation of status from class, arguing instead that class is but one form of status grouping (Hall, 1992) . 11 Stark argues that whereas Boltanski and Thévenot understand orders of worth as resolving uncertainty problems and thereby making calculable action possible, it is precisely this admixture of different orders, and the resultant uncertainty, that create opportunities for action. Following Frank Knight who understood entrepreneurship as an ability to exploit uncertainty, as opposed to a reward for risk, Stark notes that entrepreneurship is an ability 'to keep multiple principles of evaluation in play and to benefi t from that productive friction' (Stark, 2008: 14) . It is the very ambiguity of assets due to a multiplicity of evaluative criteria that provides opportunities to recombine them, a trait he espies in an organization form he calls 'heterarchy', 'in which units are laterally accountable according to difference principles of evaluation '(2008: 25) . 12 'The problems raised by relations among worlds cannot be dismissed by asso-ciating the various worlds and the worths they manifest with different persons, culture, or milieus, the way classical sociology treats relations among values and groups.' (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 216) .
